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“NEOLIBERAL CONSERVATION” IN ETHIOPIA: AN ANALYSIS 
OF CURRENT CONFLICTS IN AND AROUND PROTECTED
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ABSTRACT   Neoliberal conservation approaches have led to a rapid increase in African 
environmental protection practices since the 1990s. This paper aims to investigate the current 
management of protected areas (PAs), which is based on the neoliberal conservation approach 
adopted in Ethiopia in the 2000s, and to examine the cause and resolution of confl icts within 
the PA system. The results indicate that the state-private partnership established in the case 
of Nechisar National Park echoed the fortress conservation approach taken by the previous 
government and made confl icts with local communities more complicated and possibly 
unresolvable. Conversely, another case suggests that increased security with respect to the 
land and property rights of local communities reduces the incidence of land-use confl icts 
with park authorities. The new wildlife policy issued in 2007 may improve the overall 
community-based conservation dynamic and has great potential for providing improved 
solutions for confl icts due to increased understanding, appreciation, and valuing of local 
livelihoods by the government.
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INTRODUCTION
Many protected areas (PAs) in Africa have been the cause of confl ict, 
particularly because the establishment of many PAs during the colonial era 
required forcible eviction of local communities. Colonial rulers and certain local 
elites had initially earmarked such areas for their own personal game hunting 
and excluded the local communities who had previously inhabited and depended 
upon the land for their livelihoods. As the importance of wildlife protection for 
environmental conservation is increasingly recognized, many have come to see 
the exclusion of local people in this context as justifi ed. This approach, called 
“fortress conservation,” dominates the conceptualization and implementation of 
current conservation interventions. As a result, two situations of confl ict have 
emerged. First, the practice of creating and maintaining PAs has caused severe 
clashes between park authorities and local communities. Second, the expansion 
of farmland into wilderness areas has resulted in competition for space and 
resources between humans and wildlife. These confl icts not only affect the 
disputing parties at the micro level but also have repercussions for a variety of 
external factors that drive changes in national conservation policies, organizational 
structures, and international environmental demands, and they can lead to further 
confl ict and issues with resource allocation. 
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The fortress conservation approach, which excluded rural communities from 
a role in conserving their natural resources, is gradually making way for a new 
conservation approach known as community-based conservation (CBC) (Western 
& Wright, 1994). CBC places local communities at the center of conservation 
initiatives by empowering them to manage their natural resources and derive 
direct benefi ts from them. However, even though the concept of CBC was 
introduced at the end of the 1980s, local people in Africa are still not fully 
involved in land management and planning. This may be because the primary 
goal of most CBC projects is to generate and distribute proceeds from tourism 
and game hunting to local communities, rather than to facilitate the ownership 
of local property and natural resources by the community. In this context, the 
use of development as a conservation tool, sometimes labeled “neoliberal 
conservation,” considers economic growth and environmental protection to be 
mutually compatible. The neoliberal conservation approach takes into account 
the fact that “ecological services” can have true economic value, an aspect 
frequently neglected by previous approaches. As stated by Costanza et al. (1997: 
253), “because ecosystem services are not fully ‘captured’ in commercial markets 
or adequately qualifi ed in terms comparable with economic services and 
manufactured capital, they are often given too little weight in policy decisions.” 
Neoliberal conservation approaches, seeking to promote more profi table 
commodifi cation of natural resources, tend to involve enclosing land as a means 
of protecting the natural environment.
In Africa, this approach has led to a rapid increase in conservation practices. 
For example, in Eastern and Southern Africa, privately owned lands play a 
particularly important role in conserving critical biodiversity. The establishment 
of trans-boundary PAs in these regions, in accordance with agreements with 
neighboring countries, represents an important development in PA governance 
in Africa (Munthali, 2007), with PAs now occupying 15.9% of the total land 
area in eastern and southern Africa (Newmark, 2008). In accordance with 
neoliberal principles, this expansion of the geographic area of PAs is expected 
to increase the size of the potential tourism market. Büscher et al. (2012: 4) 
commented, “neoliberal conservation shifts the focus from how nature is used 
in and through the expansion of capitalism, to how nature is conserved in and 
through the expansion of capitalism.” New types of management, including some 
involving the private sector, and co-management initiatives such as NGO/private 
sector, state/private sector, and state/NGO initiatives, emerged through the 1980s 
and 1990s and have formed networks that promote programs focused on 
development-oriented conservation.
Neoliberal approaches can infl uence positive conservation outcomes because 
PAs are less economically exploitable, although limited concerns related to 
tourism do exist. Only highly market-oriented interventions have caused problems, 
such as animal abuse, as used to be seen “canned hunting” (hunting wild animals 
in a confi ned area, from which they cannot escape) in South Africa. Conversely, 
neoliberal conservation is sometimes criticized in terms of local participation. 
This approach is, in theory, expected to promote increased democracy and 
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Fig. 1. Ethiopia and the location of the protected areas
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participation and to protect rural communities and business practices. However, 
whether current conservation interventions actually deliver on these points remains 
open to question.(1)
In this paper, I investigate the effects of neoliberal conservation in Ethiopia 
using data collected at Senkelle Swayne’s Hartebeest Sanctuary between 2008 
and 2014 and Nechisar National Park in August 2008 (Fig. 1). I describe the 
introduction and infi ltration of neoliberal conservation in Ethiopia, examining 
some of the country’s relevant wildlife laws that directly govern the PA system, 
and analyze the background of institutional change in the area using a case 
study of a ‘privatized’ PA. I also briefl y reconsider confl ict resolution in the 
context of another PA case. 
THE INTRODUCTION OF NEOLIBERAL CONSERVATION
I. Protected Areas and Wildlife Policy in Ethiopia
Wildlife regulation in Ethiopia was introduced in 1908, during the reign of 
Emperor Menelik II, in the form of a nine-article law strictly forbidding the 
hunting of young elephants (EWCA, 2012). Ethiopian ivory exports, which were 
at their highest between 1900 and 1909, consequently decreased sharply in 1910 
(Donham & James, 2002). In 1944, three years after Ethiopia’s brief period 
under colonial rule (1936–1941), the fi rst Preservation of Game Proclamation 
was issued, which defi ned wildlife as a fi nite natural resource. Similar 
proclamations and regulations were also endorsed following the establishment 
of the Department of Forestry, Game, and Fishery by the Ministry of Agriculture 
in 1945. The Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Organization (EWCO) was 
established in 1965 and formally recognized as an autonomous body fi ve years 
later under Order No. 65/1970. Subsequently, Awash and Semien National Parks 
were established in 1969 as the fi rst Ethiopian PAs.
In 1974, Marxist revolutionaries overthrew the Ethiopian monarchy and 
declared the country a socialist state. During the socialist regime (1974–1991), 
only three PAs were established (Fig. 2). However, the new government 
maintained previously established wildlife management policies, taking a fortress 
conservation approach. During this time, local people were not given the means 
to maintain access to conservation areas and manage the natural resources therein, 
placing the local population in confl ict with conservation objectives. In 1980, 
the Forest and Wildlife Authority was established, and the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild fauna and Flora (CITES) 
was ratifi ed in 1989. 
At the time of the overthrow of the socialist regime in 1991 and in response 
to the previous regime’s approach, local people attempted to resist the 
government’s control of natural resources, even going so far as to attack park 
offi cers in an attempt to regain lost access to resources. The new government, 
led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), started 
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to rehabilitate the facilities.
In 1993, the responsibilities of the Forest and Wildlife Authority were 
transferred to the Ministry of Natural Resources Development and Environmental 
Protection, and then to the Ministry of Agriculture, when the Constitution of 
Ethiopia was adopted in 1995. The constitution promoted ethnic states and 
regions, consolidating and extending government decentralization (Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995), including with regard to the management 
of wildlife and PAs. As a result, PA management, with the exception of two 
federally administered areas, was transferred to regional governments. This refl ects 
a shift to a more community-oriented approach, perhaps infl uenced by global 
CBC trends. 
In 1998, the duties and responsibilities of the Wildlife Conservation Authority 
were transferred to the Biodiversity Conservation and Research Institute, and 
then, in 2003, to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. During 
the period from 1997 to 2008, 10 more PAs were created. Thus, the total area 
of PAs increased with each regime. In 2007, the Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation 
Authority (EWCA) was established, with the mission of facilitating active 
participation in and unifi cation of parks and other PAs in the name of wildlife 
conservation. Currently, 20 national parks and three sanctuaries are distributed 
across Ethiopia’s nine ethnically based administrative regions and two self-
governing administrations. PAs range in area from 19.4 km2 to 6,987 km2, 
encompassing a total area of 52,478 km2 and occupying 4.7% of the total land 
area of Ethiopia.
II. Privatization of PA Management
Immediately following decentralization in 1995, the federal government 
struggled with chronic budget shortages and PA management problems. However, 
Fig. 2. Total area of protected areas in Ethiopia
Source: Based on data from EWCA (2012).
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between 2004 and 2010, Ethiopia’s GDP grew by an average of 11% per year.
This high economic growth may have infl uenced the transition from the 
government’s sluggish wildlife management to a neoliberal conservation approach. 
Accordingly, in 2004, the federal government placed Ethiopia’s national parks 
under the management of African Parks, an NGO devoted to international 
conservation that was established in 2003. African Parks has started to negotiate 
with each government to manage the national parks in Zambia, Malawi and 
Ethiopia (African Parks, 2003). Currently, the organization manages seven parks 
(covering 4.1 million hectares) in six countries: Chad, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Malawi, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Zambia. By 2020, 
African Parks aims to increase the number of parks it manages to 15. According 
to The African Parks web site explains the incentive to manage the state-owned 
PAs as follows: “[I]n Africa, properly managed protected areas are not just 
important for preserving biological diversity, they are also some of the continent’s 
greatest economic assets … although there are over 1,200 formally registered 
national parks in Africa, many exist on paper alone.” This is a typical neoliberal 
view, wherein natural resources are regarded as economic assets, and re-orientation 
of the poor management of African PAs is encouraged. The involvement of 
African Parks and the introduction of tourism-oriented management strategies 
were triggered by issues of underfunding and limited management expertise 
among Ethiopian authorities at the time.
In 2004, Nechisar National Park in Ethiopia’s southern region was the country’s 
fi rst park to be managed by African Parks. The park, whose 514 square kilometers 
of territory include the Nechisar (“white grass”) Plains, was offi cially established 
in 1974 to protect Swayne’s hartebeest and other wildlife. 
III. Recurrence of Confl icts with Local Communities
The African Parks approach combines conservation practices with business 
expertise, placing importance on the economic benefi t of promoting ecotourism. 
The federal government has similarly prioritized tourism development to 
encourage the infl ux of foreign expenditure. For example, since 2005, several 
development schemes have been promoted under the Ministry of Tourism and 
Development (formerly the Tourism Commission) to attract and maintain tourism 
and to encourage investment by the private sector. 
Under the management of African Parks, visitors to Nechisar National Park 
steadily increased from 2004 to 2007 (African Parks, 2007). Subsequently, the 
organization proposed the reintroduction of big game (such as elephants and 
buffalo) to restore biodiversity, as well as the erection of extensive game fencing. 
This proposal was justifi ed as a way to reduce human-wildlife confl ict; however, 
enclosing much of the park would also cause confl icts between governments 
and local communities.
Nechisar National Park had been the site of frequent confl icts with surrounding 
communities since its inception, and the contract agreement between African 
Parks and the federal and regional governments called for the eviction of over 
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10,000 Kore and Guji people who inhabited or utilized the park illegally. It was 
agreed that implementation of the agreement would commence once park 
authorities had completed the resettlement of people illegally occupying the park. 
In this way, the regional government took a classical fortress conservation 
approach by enforcing the eviction of local people between 2004 and 2005. 
According to one international human rights NGO, the federal and regional 
governments relocated 1,020 Kore families, promising to provide land, a clinic, 
schools, and wells along with food and approximately 17 USD(2) per person in 
moving compensation. These promises were not, however, fully fulfi lled, and in 
2004, 463 houses belonging to Guji people were burned down by police and 
park authorities (Refugees International, 2004; 2005). These actions sparked 
considerable criticism from international human rights organizations.
Subsequently, African Parks attempted to directly negotiate with the Guji 
people. While agreements were reached with some Guji communities, they were 
ultimately not formally recognized. In December 2007, African Parks ceded 
management of the park prior to the end date stipulated in its contract, citing 
the Oromia regional government’s uncooperative negotiations with the Guji 
people as a major factor in its withdrawal (African Parks, 2012). 
In 2005, African Parks started another conservation project in Omo National 
Park (4,068 km2), which had been established in 1966. However, in 2008, African 
Parks withdrew from this park as well, again citing confl icts over unsustainable 
use of the parks by local people. African Parks further criticized a human rights 
organization for their campaign (African Parks, 2012).
The neoliberal conservation approach taken by African Parks echoed the 
fortress conservation approach taken by the government in previous years, 
particularly in terms of the distrust of local people. For example, the Guji were 
forcibly evicted from the park in 1982 (Getachew, 2007; Abiyot, 2009), decades 
before their subsequent re-eviction under Africa Parks’ management in 2004. 
Later, at the end of the socialist regime and immediately afterwards, Nechisar 
National Park suffered considerable human-infl icted damage, and as a result, the 
Guji returned to their traditional grazing areas in the park. 
Although Africa Parks predicates its actions on the promise of “future benefi t,” 
it is evident from the aforementioned examples that forced resettlement 
conclusively deepened the split between park authorities and local communities. 
Local people strongly resisted African Parks’ commodifi cation of conservation. 
This may be because, as one SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities, and 
People’s Region, one of Ethiopia’s nine ethnic divisions) government offi cial 
involved in local community negotiations explained, the conservation of PAs is 
a single issue among many other region-specifi c ones that either transcend or 
confl ict with conservation concerns.(3)
IV. The 2007 Proclamation to Provide for the Development, Conservation, and Uti-
lization of Wildlife
The federal government issued a new wildlife law in 2007, in the midst of 
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struggles among the park authority, African Parks, and the local communities. 
Concurrent with the establishment of the EWCA, the new federal wildlife policy, 
issued under proclamation No. 541/2007, encouraged the development of wildlife 
resources—specifi cally, their sustainable, yet increasingly market-oriented, 
utilization. Accordingly, the administration of all PAs shifted from the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. 
One purpose of this policy was that it promoted wildlife-based tourism and 
encouraged private investment. For example, Article 6 indicated that private 
investors can be authorized to administer wildlife conservation areas via 
concession agreements with the federal government. 
However, the law also regarded local communities as important stakeholders 
in PA administration. For example, the Wildlife Development, Conservation and 
Utilization Council of Ministers Regulations No. 163/2008 ensured that 
“Community Wildlife Development and Utilization Areas,” located outside the 
PAs and administered by the government or private concessionaires, were 
managed and utilized by the local community. Thus, local communities, which 
had long been prevented from accessing natural resources within PAs, are now 
allowed to partake in their economic utilization (such as in ecotourism and sport 
hunting), providing that the income is used for community development and 
conservation activities. 
Also of note is that people inhabiting the regions surrounding PAs are permitted 
to engage in the seasonal utilization of natural resources, such as beekeeping, 
honey harvesting, cutting, taking, or foraging of vegetation, under controlled 
conditions. Game hunting is allowed for people over 18 years old who possess 
a resident hunter license (available for a yearly fee of 2,000 birr). People are 
also permitted to hunt, under controlled conditions, wildlife that endanger human 
life or damage property. 
Recent wildlife policies and regulations emphasize development-oriented 
conservation, the practical use of tourism, and the local people’s participation 
in natural resource management and utilization. However, there is a tendency 
for the federal government to regain control of conservation area management 
from the regional government. The three types of wildlife conservation areas 
(national parks, wildlife sanctuaries and reserves, and controlled hunting areas) 
are administered by both federal and regional governments. Consequently, the 
federal government now has much greater sovereignty over PAs than it has had 
in previous years, because the private sector must have concession agreements 
with both the federal and regional governments to take part in PA management. 
In this sense, the administrative sphere of the federal administration has been 
expanding since the government embarked on decentralization in the mid-1990s 
following the 1992 constitution of the transitional government of Ethiopia.
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SANCTUARIES AS DE FACTO “COMMUNITY WILDLIFE DEVELOPMENT 
AND UTILIZATION AREAS”
Senkelle Swayne’s Hartebeest Sanctuary (36.4 km2) is located on the west 
side of the Great Rift Valley, 300 km south of Addis Ababa. The Arsi Oromo 
ethnic group grazed livestock and cultivated the land in the region before the 
sanctuary was established, and has a deep psychological attachment to the area 
(Nishizaki, 2004). When the sanctuary was established in 1976 to protect the 
Swayne’s hartebeest, an endangered and endemic species, the park authority 
regarded the area as a no-man’s land, and ignored the concerns of the local 
people. 
In 1991, at the very end of the socialist regime, local people started to destroy 
the sanctuary’s offi ce buildings, steal offi ce equipment, and poach hartebeests. 
They justifi ed these actions as retaliation for misdeeds of the sanctuary’s offi cers. 
Taking advantage of the unsettled political situation, the Arsi Oromo escalated 
their resistance against the park authority and its conservation policies (Nishizaki, 
2004). For example, they openly grazed livestock and collected fi rewood within 
the sanctuary and began to reclaim and reoccupy land there.
Tourism in the Senkelle sanctuary remained underdeveloped because relatively 
small animals such as hartebeest, oribi, and bushbuck did not satisfy tourists 
seeking big game. In response, the foreign conservation organization Al Wabra 
Wildlife Preservation (AWWP) provided fi nancial support to the park authority 
between 2002 and 2005. This support, which included the employment of 
additional scouts from local communities and strengthened patrols, was deemed 
a success in terms of increased hartebeest numbers and decreased poaching 
(AWWP, 2005). In this sense, the typical fortress conservation approach at the 
time of the socialist regime was replaced by an incoherent approach that still 
depended on bringing local communities under control.
However, in recent years, the park authority has also begun to understand the 
needs of the local community, allowing them to utilize the land adjoining the 
sanctuary and the natural resources within the sanctuary. For example, since 
2005, local people from six villages (kebeles) have been allowed to access the 
grassland in the sanctuary for a month in the dry season for the purpose of 
cutting and collecting grass (Pennisetum sphacelatum) for roof thatching and 
fuel (Fig. 3). 
Additionally, following the onset of the Arsi Oromo occupation of the state 
farm and sanctuary from 1995 onward, formal distribution of land was conducted 
in 2006, because land shortages were presumed to be a major factor infl uencing 
reoccupation.(4) When I surveyed the area in 1999, about 1,400 huts surrounded 
the sanctuary in a tight row extending 20 km along its border, and farmland 
extended out from these huts toward the original village (Nishizaki, 2004). 
Current formal land distribution follows the same strategies as previous efforts: 
land is reorganized among the six villages (kebeles) bordering the sanctuary, 
then distributed using the traditional clan (gosa) system, the people’s own cultural 
method. 
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In addition to land distribution, social development programs in the 2000s 
provided local communities with highly desired clinics, schools, and wells. Of 
particular importance was drinking water, which had not been available in this 
area for a long time. Thus, local communities specifi cally negotiated with the 
park authority, using the water situation as a strategy to delay negotiation with 
the park authority regarding their use of the sanctuary as pasture land because 
they knew that the government could not construct a well quickly. However, 
the government fi nally constructed the well (Fig. 4) and began to negotiate land 
issues with the local people. These cases indicate that the current relationship 
between the park authority and the local communities contributes to the avoidance 
of land-use confl ict resolution. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, I analyzed the current neoliberal conservation approach adopted 
in Ethiopia in the 2000s, examining how confl icts embedded in the current PA 
Fig. 3. Left: Local people cut, collect, and carry grass in the sanctuary, Right: House of the Oromo 
people, prepared for roof thatching (February 2014)
Fig. 4. Left: A reservoir, called haro, that had been utilized by local communities and whose use 
is now prohibited (February 1999), Right: A well was constructed by the government (February 
2014)
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system were caused and solved, and focusing on recent dynamics in the 
relationship between park authorities and local communities.
The case of Nechisar National Park is an example of advanced neoliberal 
conservation policy. In this case, the federal government combined its 
development-oriented policy with the market-oriented approach favored by 
international conservation bodies. This necessitated controlling the conservation 
areas with an iron fi st, leading to the contradictory approach of forcible 
resettlement, combined with occasional emphasis on “community participation.” 
This contrasts with the conventional conservation approach taken by powerful 
international outsiders who support PA management—not only in fi nancial terms, 
but also in terms of providing local communities with a central role in land 
and resource management. Iwai (2009: 73) called this approach “community-
friendly fortress conservation.” This kind of governance of PAs makes confl icts 
with local communities more complicated, and possibly even unresolvable, 
because they necessitate negotiation with an essentially invisible external party.
Another complication of neoliberal conservation is that once a program seems 
to have failed, external agents can easily withdraw from the landscape. African 
Parks insisted on modern, results-focused PA-management techniques rather than 
more traditional, governmentally favored procedures. However, because the 
biologically diverse ecosystems in question are extremely complex, conservation 
interventions in such areas require long-term management. In this case, an 
adaptive management approach based on learning and observation and reliance 
on clearly established scientifi c and social processes may be required. 
Based on these fi ndings, we can conclude that successful co-management 
involving integration of the government, local communities, and the private 
sector is seldom successful. While governments have expected the private sector 
to make strong conservation interventions, they have also partially retained the 
classical approach by extending centralized government control over wildlife, 
land, and other natural resources. Consequently, the displacement of populations 
continues, ignoring the land rights and human rights of the local people. Such 
actions have drawn criticism, not only from local communities but also from 
international human rights organizations. As a result, co-management is regarded 
as a failure in this context. 
The case of the Senkelle Sanctuary further illustrates the local, sometimes 
violent, confl icts that accompany the clarifi cation of PA borders by conservation 
agencies. If enlarging the PA area had been the only measure taken by the park 
authority in 2006, confl ict may have intensifi ed, as it did in the case of Nechisar 
National Park. Instead, the government conducted formal land distribution to 
local communities in order to reduce illegal land occupation, and allowed limited 
use of the sanctuary’s grassland. Some antipathy remains in this relationship, 
especially when grass shortages result in livestock feed shortfalls, but this strategy 
has allowed for the temporary avoidance of more severe confl ict. However, while 
certain local people are currently permitted to use grassland in selected areas, 
the anticipated rapid market expansion is expected to lead to signifi cant ecosystem 
disturbance. Thus, ecological surveys and some form of control over foraging 
202 N. Nishizaki
and collection will inevitably be necessary. Furthermore, the ability of the local 
people to provide environmental governance by managing land and natural 
resources is not recognized. 
The government’s wildlife policy, issued in 2007, authorized the private sector 
and local communities to jointly administer PAs, emphasizing development-
oriented conservation. The prevalence of neoliberal forms of governance is still 
clearly observable; for example, EWCA aims to make Ethiopia one of Africa’s 
top fi ve countries in wildlife tourism by 2020 (EWCA, 2012). Additionally, 
following widespread decentralization in 1995, the federal government aims to 
promote the triad of state, market, and community as a superior structure for 
PA management. These efforts are partially supported by the aforementioned 
2008 regulations, which allowed for PA management and resource utilization by 
local communities, as had been customarily allowed in previous years. However, 
the federal government also increased the number of PAs over which they have 
management authority. Therefore, in a sense, Ethiopia’s current wildlife policy 
aggressively promotes development-oriented conservation, which echoes neoliberal 
conservation, but still contains inherent contradictions: decentralization vs. 
centralization, CBC vs. fortress conservation.
This study also examined some cases of local confl ict resolution. While local 
people have mainly used aggressive measures, such as poaching, illegal collection 
of fi rewood, and land enclosure, some have been receptive to conservation efforts, 
as seen in the anti-poaching effort conducted in Mago National Park (Nishizaki, 
2009). Using various styles of resistance, including the “weapons of the weak” 
(Scott, 1985), local people are negotiating with park authorities to regain control 
over land and natural resources and thereby to improve their daily livelihoods. 
Sometimes, it is possible to fi nd potential for co-management of natural resources 
that involves both the authorities and the local residents. The Senkelle is also 
a very rare case in which such results were achieved through tough negotiations. 
However, the greatest challenge for co-management is that the park authority 
still regards the local community as a threat that contributes to environmental 
degradation.
The fi rst step in solving confl icts is to understand, appreciate, and properly 
evaluate local praxis before criticizing communities for their lack of education, 
limited project capacity, and weak local institutions. Local people have 
experienced a long history of conservation, from which they have learned and 
developed coping strategies. In this context, there is sometimes very little room 
for confl ict resolution. Currently, the greatest challenge in this regard is to correct 
the imbalance of power among multiple stakeholders. For example, local praxis 
is generally only recognized at the most local level, such as within a conservation 
area. While some individual park staff members place high importance on 
maintaining a good relationship with the local community, others are indifferent 
to or completely ignore local residents. Additionally, there is a huge divide 
between local praxis and wildlife policymakers or project representatives at 
higher levels. 
In some respects, the new wildlife policy may improve the overall community–
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conservation dynamic. For example, the Community Wildlife Development and 
Utilization Areas, a new PA category defi ned in 2007, have great potential to 
provide better solutions to confl icts between the park authority and local 
communities. If properly managed by local communities, such areas can generate 
local profi t while preserving customary rights to natural resources. 
However, in the past few years, massive amounts of land in Ethiopia have 
been bought by foreign organizations (Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010), 
depriving communities of their land-use rights, destroying traditional farming 
methods and knowledge, and sometimes displacing communities from their 
ancestral lands and natural environment. In light of this recent land-grabbing 
trend, it is likely that the additional zoning required to establish Community 
Wildlife Development and Utilization Areas will generate new confl icts, and it 
is essential that national and global wildlife management policies take this into 
consideration. Ultimately, confl ict resolution cannot be applied as a single, 
generalizable argument; instead, it must be experimental and context-specifi c, 
whether local, national, or global. 
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NOTES
(1) See, for example, Sullivan & Igoe (2010).
(2) One USD was equivalent in value to about 8.6 ETB in 2004. 
(3) Informant: K/S, age approximately 50 years, who had worked for the regional 
government (SNNPR) in Jinka and Awasa for about 30 years. Interview was conducted 
in Jinka on December 30, 2012.
(4) Offi cially, all land in Ethiopia is owned by the government, but individuals have 
customary rights.
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